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Abstract 
This article considers the ongoing debate over the appropriation of well-known and 
famous trade marks by the No Logo Movement for the purposes of political and social 
critique. It focuses upon one sensational piece of litigation in South Africa, Laugh It 
Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark 
International. In this case, a group called Laugh It Off Promotions subjected the 
trade marks of the manufacturers of Carling Beer were subjected to parody, social 
satire, and culture jamming. The beer slogan “Black Label” was turned into a T-Shirt 
entitled “Black Labour/ White Guilt”. In the ensuing litigation, the High Court of 
South Africa and the Supreme Court of Appeal were of the opinion that the 
appropriation of the mark was a case of hate speech. However, the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa disagreed, finding that the parodies of a well-known, famous 
trade mark did not constitute trade mark dilution. Moseneke J observed that there was 
a lack of evidence of economic or material harm; and Sachs J held that there is a 
need to provide latitude for parody, laughter, and freedom of expression. The decision 
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa provides some important insights into the 
nature of trade mark dilution, the role of parody and satire, and the relevance of 
constitutional protections of freedom of speech and freedom of expression. Arguably, 
the ruling will be of help in the reformation of trade mark dilution law in other 
jurisdictions – such as the United States. The decision in Laugh It Off Promotions v. 
South African Breweries International demonstrates that trade mark law should not 
be immune from careful constitutional scrutiny.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Does the law have a sense of humour? This question is raised 
whenever the irresistible force of free expression, in the form of 
parody, meets the immovable object of property rights, in the form 
of trademark protection. And if international experience is anything 
to go by, it would seem that far from providing clear guidance court 
decisions on the topic have been as variable as judicial humour 
itself. 
Sachs J in Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African  
Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International
1
 
In May 2005, the Constitutional Court of South Africa considered whether a series of 
transgressive T-shirts infringed the trade marks of the manufacturers of Carling Beer. 
The case was a cause célèbre highlighting the protection of famous trade marks, 
culture jamming and “adbusting”, and the freedom of political and artistic expression 
[Figure 1]. 
Laugh It Off Promotions2 makes and sell T-shirts that employ "social satire or 
parody".3 Its principal, Justin Bartlett Nurse, a journalism graduate, has explained that 
he is one of many "conscientious objectors to niche-market selfhood and mass-market 
mediocrity" who "grew up to be brand atheists".4  He employs what he calls 
"ideological jujitsu".5   Nurse articulates his credos of culture jamming: 
Jujitsu is a form of martial art that sees a fighter using his 
opponent’s massive weight against him. In this same way, Laugh it 
Off has used the force of a massive entity (namely, the Black Label 
brand) back on itself… Like the political cartoonist scribbles on his 
inkpad, like the comedian does his interpretations on stage, we put 
our message on T-shirts. We have accepted that we operate in a 
capitalist economy and we have found a medium that affords us the 
                                                 
1
 J Sachs in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Case CCT 42/04) 
[2005] (27 May 2005), the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/3549.PDF. 
2
 Laugh It Off Promotions URL:  http://www.laughitoff.co.za/. 
3
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Case CCT 42/04) [2005] (27 
May 2005), the Constitutional Court of South Africa, [14]. 
4
 See note 14. 
5
 See note 14. 
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opportunity of earning enough money to continue saying what we 
want to say.6 
Laugh It Off Promotions lampoons well-known, registered trade marks of large 
corporations to make a statement about corporate policies or practices.  It also seeks 
to probe issues bearing on the broader society; to assert free expression and in so 
doing to challenge the inordinate use of trade mark laws to silence expressions that 
are unflattering about brands. 
Laugh It Off Promotions marketed T-shirts using a range of brands - including those 
of Carling Beer. Sabmark International was the owner of trade marks, which it 
licensed to South African Breweries Ltd for use on beer bottles and related products. 
One of the trade marks states: "America’s lusty, lively beer; Carling Black Label 
Beer; Brewed in South Africa" [Figure 2].  South African Breweries discovered that 
Laugh It Off Promotions had marketed T-shirts, which bore a print that was markedly 
similar, in lettering, colour scheme and background, to that of the "Carling Black 
Label" trade marks. The words “Black Label” on the registered trade marks were 
replaced, on the T-shirt, with “Black Labour”. The trade mark "Carling Beer" was 
substituted with “White Guilt”; and the words "America’s lusty lively beer" and 
“enjoyed by men around the world” were replaced with the print "Africa’s lusty lively 
exploitation since 1652” and "No regard given worldwide" [Figure 3].  South African 
Breweries brought legal action against Laugh It Off Promotions on the grounds that 
the unauthorised use of its registered trade marks by the applicant in the course of 
trade offended the anti-dilution provisions of South African trade mark law.  
In addition to the complaints of South African Breweries, Laugh It Off Promotions 
has also had to grapple with a host of complaints from other disgruntled trade mark 
owners. In Kirkbi v Laugh It Off Promotions, Lego brought a legal action against 
Laugh It Off Promotions over a T-shirt design, which featured two block figures in a 
suggestive position, with the word “Legover” printed underneath it.7 Lego argued that 
the T-shirts were “detrimental to the distinctive character or repute” of its trademarks. 
Justin Bartlett Nurse responded that it was not Lego behind the action but “expensive 
patent lawyers trying to scrounge Christmas bonuses from their wealthy clients.”8The 
trade mark owners of “Mr Min” complained about the parody of the term “Mr Min” – 
used in associated with cleaning products - with T-shirts, bearing the logo “Mr Sin” 
and featuring representation of the United States President, George W. Bush [Figure 
4].9 The trade mark owners complained about the parody of the term “Weet-bix” with 
T-shirts featuring the logo “Weed-brix” in connection with marijuana use [Figure 5].10 
The holders of trade marks in respect of Red Bull objected to the sale of T-Shirts by 
                                                 
6
 See note 93. 
7
 Kirkbi v Laugh It Off Promotions (Case 97502, 2002). 
8
 Agence France-Presse, “Suggestive T-Shirt Has Danish Toy Giant’s Knickers in a Knot”, Agence 
France-Presse, 17 December 2002. 
9
 Reckitt Benckiser SA Pty Ltd, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Mr Min’”, 1 
December 2003. 
10
 Pioneer Foods, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Weet-bix’” 28 June 2004. 
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Laugh It Off Promotions bearing the slogan “Dead Bull” [Figure 6].11 The owners of 
the trade mark in respect of “Dettol” were offended by the T-shirt, “Death Toll” 
[Figure 7].12 Similarly, the owners of the trade mark “Demostos” did not like the use 
of the sign “Domestic Violence”.13 The trade mark owners of the trade mark “Diesel 
for Successful Living” objected to T-shirts bearing the slogan “Denial for Successful 
Loafing” [Figure 8].14 
The holders of copyright and trade marks in respect of the Billabong Wave Logo 
objected to its use by Laugh It Off Promotions.15 Colgate Palmolive objected to the 
use of its trade mark “Black Like Me” [Figure 9].16There were also complaints from 
trade-mark owners about the use of the trade marks, “Husky Dog”, “Incredible 
Connection”, “Joshua Doore” and “Ouma”, in what they felt was unsavoury 
contexts.17The Coca-Cola Company accused Laugh It Off Promotions of trade mark 
infringement and passing off in respect of its “Corruption” T-Shirt [Figure 10].18 This 
litany of trade mark infringement notices illustrates that action by the South African 
breweries was not merely an isolated occurrence. 
Other trade mark owners refrained from taking action against Laugh It Off 
Promotions. In other T-shirts, Kentucky Friend Chicken was depicted as “Unlucky 
Fried Chicken”; “Standard Bank” turned into “Standard Wank”; Shell Ultra City 
became “Hell Ultra Shitty”; McDonalds was adorned with the logo, “Moo, Make 
every day a cow’s last” [Figure 11]; “Virgin” became “Viagra” [Figure 12] and the 
National Lottery was depicted as “National Robbery”.19A commentator has observed 
of the work of Laugh It Off Promotions: “Culture jamming draws on the 
carnivalesque, anaesthetic that sites resistance in humour, the grotesque(just think of 
the “Standard Wank” shirt), the disguised, the turning of common sense on its head”.20 
                                                 
11
 Red Bull GmbH, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Red Bull’”, 11 August 2000. 
12
 Reckitt Benckiser SA (Pty) Ltd, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Dettol’”, 22 
December 2003. 
13
 Unilever PLC and Lever Bonds SA Pty Ltd, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of 
‘Demostos’”, 20 February 2004. 
14
 Diesel s.p.a. “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Diesel’”, 18 December 2001. 
15
 GSM (Trademark) Pty Ltd and Billabong SA CC, “Copyright and Trade Mark Infringement Notice 
in respect of ‘Wave Logo’, 20 November 2003. 
16
 Colgate Palmolive, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Black Like Me’”, 23 July 2002. 
17
 M W Slabbert, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in Respect of Husky Dog”, 3 April 2002; 
Incredible Connection Pty Ltd, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of ‘Incredible 
Connection’”, 23 May 2002; JDG Trading Pty Limited, “Trade Mark Infringement Notice in respect of 
‘Joshua Doore’ Brand”, 4 December 2003; and Foodcorp (Pty) Limited, “Trade Mark Infringement 
Notice in respect of ‘Ouma’ Brand”, 4 August 2004. 
18
 Coca Cola, “Trade Mark Infringement and Passing Off Notice in respect of ‘Coca-Cola’ Script”, 8 
July 2002. In Coca-Cola Co. v Gemini Rising, Inc. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), the defendant 
sold posters that replaced the slogan “Enjoy Coca-Cola” with the phrase “Enjoy Cocaine.” The court 
granted an injunction in favour of Coca-Cola. For a history of Coca-Cola, see H McQueen, The 
Essence of Capitalism: The Origins of Our Future (Sceptre, Sydney, 2001). 
19
 E Ellis, “Big Battle Brews over ‘Joke’ T-Shirt”, Africa News Service, 14 May 2002. 
20
 J Jonker, “Touching the Trade Mark”, (2003), 23 Rhodes Journalism Review 42-43. 
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This article uses the dramatic conflict in Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African 
Breweries International (Finance) B.V. t/a Sabmark International to consider the 
relationship between trade mark dilution, culture jamming, and freedom of 
expression. It advances three main arguments. First, this paper recognises that the 
owners of famous trade marks have legitimate rights to protect their brands from 
dilution – whether through tarnishment or blurring. Nonetheless, it maintains that 
there is a need for trade mark owners to demonstrate material and economic harm in 
order to establish a case for trade mark dilution. Second, this analysis considers the 
impact of trade mark dilution laws in the context of cultural discourse. Patricia 
Loughlan notes that there is increasing conflict between trade mark owners and 
culture jammers: 
Famous trade marks can and do become significant cultural 
resources and important elements of public discourse and popular 
expression. The problem is that trade mark proprietors have and 
increasingly assert an interest in controlling, not just the traditional 
"badge of origin" use of their trade marks by rivals in the market-
place, but also these other, potentially culturally significant uses of 
the marks.21 
It is contended that trade mark owners should not be able to limit parody, satire, or 
culture jamming on the basis of arguments about trade mark dilution. Third, this 
article explores the long-standing tension between the rights accorded to trade mark 
owners and freedom of speech.22It is argued that courts should not assume that 
intellectual property laws are necessarily compatible with constitutional protections of 
freedom of speech.23 There is a need to subject trade mark rights to strict scrutiny to 
ensure that they do not have an adverse impact upon the protections of freedom of 
speech afforded by constitutional law and other legal doctrines. 
This article considers how a succession of South African courts have interpreted the 
transgressive image of the "Black Labour, White Guilt" T-shirt.  It highlights the 
range of hermeneutic strategies that were deployed to make sense of this unstable, 
ambiguous icon.  Indeed, the "Black Labour, White Guilt" T-Shirt proved to be a 
Rorschach ink blot for judicial methodologies. There are three parts to this piece. Part 
2 considers the dispute over the appropriation of the Carling Black Label mark in the 
context of wider debates over trade mark law, culture jamming, and the No Logo anti-
global capitalism movement. Part 3 explores the various approaches of the High Court 
                                                 
21
 P Loughlan, “Protecting Culturally Significant Uses Of Trade Marks (Without A First Amendment)", 
(2000) 22 European Intellectual Property Review 328.  
22
 For a history and taxonomy of trade marks, see P Mollerup, Marks of Excellence: The History and 
Taxonomy of Trademarks (Phaidon Press, 1999).  
23
 For instance, J Ginsburg in the majority in Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) 239 F.3d 372 
observes of United States law: “The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in 
time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are 
compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and 
publication of free expression. As Harper & Row observed: “[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”” 
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of South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa to the "Black Labour, White Guilt" T-shirts.  The lower courts maintained that 
the appropriation of the mark was an instance of "hate speech", and an abuse of 
freedom of speech.  Moseneke J in the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
maintained that trade mark dilution requires economic or material harm.  Sachs J 
emphasized the importance of parody, laughter, and freedom of expression. Part 
4provides a comparative analysis of the protection of well known and famous trade 
marks. It charts the evolution and the development of trade mark dilution in the 
United States; and considers recent reforms to the legal doctrine.  It is contended that 
the decision in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International 
could be a useful precedent to guide superior courts in dealing with litigation over 
parodies of well-known and famous trade marks. 
2. Culture Jamming 
By attempting to enclose our shared culture in sanitized and 
controlled brand cocoons, these corporations have themselves 
created [a] surge of opposition... By thirstily absorbing social 
critiques and political movements as sources of brand “meaning,” 
they have radicalized that opposition still further. By abandoning 
their traditional role as direct, secure employers to pursue their 
branding dreams, they have lost the loyalty that once protected them 
from citizen rage. And by pounding the message of self-sufficiency 
into a generation of workers, they have inadvertently empowered 
their critics to express that rage without fear. 
Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim At The Brand Bullies
24
 
The dispute in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International 
is not a mere isolated skirmish between a group of provocateurs and a disgruntled 
corporation. It is emblematic of a larger cultural conflict between social activists and 
owners of famous trade marks.  Justin Bartlett Nurse draws his strategies and tactics 
from a well-established aesthetic tradition of culture jamming. He is sympathetic to 
the cause of a socially-progressive, anti-capitalist politics. A number of pundits and 
commentators have championed the No Logo movement. The Canadian journalist and 
political philosopher, Naomi Klein, has helped popularize the tactics and strategies of 
culture jamming in her manifesto. She has described the dispute over the Carling 
Black Label as “potentially bigger than the McLibel case”.25 Rosemary Coombe, 
Kembrew McLeod, and David Bollier have sought to analyse the use of trade mark 
infringement and dilution actions. Sonia Katyal has suggested that the adoption of 
culture jamming techniques is a form of “semiotic disobedience”. There has been a 
                                                 
24
 N Klein, No Logo:  Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (2000), p. 441-442. 
25
 T Koenderman, “Trademarks: No Laughing Matter”, Financial Mail, 20 December 2002, p. 12. The 
“McLibel case” was a famous defamation case involving the McDonald’s Restaurants suing 
environmental activists, David Morris and Helen Steel: McDonald's Restaurants v Morris and Steel 
(McLibel case) [1997] EWHC QB 366; Morris and Steel . McDonald's Restaurants [1999] EWCA Civ 
1144; and Steel and Morris v. The United Kingdom [2005] ECHR (Application no. 68416/01). 
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strong counter-reaction to such popular and academic critiques of trade mark law and 
practice. The Economist magazine has attacked and ridiculed the No Logo thesis 
presented by Naomi Klein. Trade mark traditionalists have defended the value of 
trade marks, maintaining that they fulfil the original objectives set for them. 
Marketing experts have protested that trade marks can serve useful and progressive 
purposes. Such sceptics of the No Logo movement have questioned its revolutionary 
credos. They have suggested that, far from being an economic critique, culture 
jamming is ultimately complicit with consumer capitalism. 
2.1 The No Logo Movement 
The phrase culture jamming was inspired by the technique of electronically 
interfering with broadcast signals.26 The agitprop band, Negativland, coined the 
phrase “culture jamming” in 1984 to describe a range of subversive activities. 
In 1993, Mark Dery wrote the provocative pamphlet, “Culture Jamming: Hacking, 
Slashing and Sniping in the Empire of Signs”. He sought to define provide a short 
history of the aesthetic and political credos of culture jamming: 
Culture jamming... is directed against an ever more intrusive, 
instrumental technoculture whose operant mode is the manufacture 
of consent through the manipulation of symbols... 
Part artistic terrorists, part vernacular critics, culture jammers, like 
Eco's "communications guerrillas," introduce noise into the signal 
as it passes from transmitter to receiver, encouraging idiosyncratic, 
unintended interpretations. Intruding on the intruders, they invest 
ads, newscasts, and other media artifacts with subversive meanings; 
simultaneously, they decrypt them, rendering their seductions 
impotent. Jammers offer irrefutable evidence that the right has no 
copyright on war waged with incantations and simulations. And, 
like Ewen's cultural cryptographers, they refuse the role of passive 
shoppers, renewing the notion of a public discourse.  
Finally, and just as importantly, culture jammers are Groucho 
Marxists, ever mindful of the fun to be had in the joyful demolition 
of oppressive ideologies.27 
Dery noted that culture jamming had a number of historical antecedents – including 
samizdat, underground literature; Situationistdetournement; and subculturalbricolage. 
He noted that culture jamming could assume a number of guises – such as sniping and 
subvertising; media hoaxing; audio agitprop; and billboard banditry. Dery predicted 
                                                 
26
 V Carducci, “Culture Jamming: A Sociological Perspective”, (2006), 6 Journal of Consumer Culture 
116-138 at 116. 
27
 M Dery, “Culture Jamming: Hacking, Slashing and Sniping in the Empire of Signs”, (1993), 
http://www.levity.com/markdery/culturjam.html. 
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that hackers, slashers, and snipers would take advantage of the possibilities presented 
by the Internet and virtual communities. 
There are a range of groups and collectives employing culture jamming strategies. In 
a contribution to Censoring Culture, Giselle Fahimian provides case studies of the 
long term-goals and organizational styles of three famous organisations - 
®TM
ark, 
Adbusters, and Negativland.28 
®TM
ark is an anonymous group of media provocateurs 
who engage in acts of cultural sabotage – perhaps most famous for swapping the 
voice boxes of Barbie and G.I. Joe Dolls.29 Fahimian notes: “In order to limit the legal 
liability of its members, 
®TM
ark is structured in the most decentralized and anonymous 
manner possible.”30 The Adbusters Media Foundation is “a global network of artists, 
activists, writers, pranksters, students, educators and entrepreneurs who want to 
advance the new social activist movement of the information age”.31 The non-profit 
organization engages in the publication of a monthly magazine, Adbusters, an 
advertising advocacy campaign called “PowerShift”, and the maintenance of a culture 
jammers network [Figure 13]. Negativland is a musical collective, which have 
engaged in the appropriation of copyright works and trade mark signs in their sound 
recordings.32 The group has sought to promote a philosophy of free artistic 
appropriation.33 
In No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Naomi Klein launched a polemic 
against the corporate control of well-known brands and trade marks [Figure 14].34  
She explored the growing opposition among culture jammers to corporate rules.  
Naomi Klein considers the treatment of well-known brands and trade marks.  She 
explains the title of her best-selling book: “The book is hinged on a simple 
hypothesis:  that as more people discover the brand-name secrets of the global logo 
web, their outrage will fuel the next big political movement, a vast wave of opposition 
squarely targeting transnational corporations, particularly those with very high name-
brand recognition”.35 
Klein first examines the surrender of culture and education to marketing.  She reports 
on how the promise of cultural choice was betrayed by the forces of mergers, 
predatory franchising, synergy and corporate censorship. Klein considers the 
corporate assault on employment, civil liberties, and civil space. She focuses upon the 
growing opposition among culture jammers to corporate rules. Klein seeks to explain 
the popularity of the practice of “culture- jamming”: 
                                                 
28
 G Fahimian, ‘How the IP Guerillas Won: 
®TM
ark, Adbusters, Negativland, and the “Bullying Back” 
of Creative Freedom and Social Commentary’, in R Atkins, S Mintcheva, Censoring Culture: 
Contemporary Threats to Free Expression, (2006), p. 132-148. 
29
 
®TM
ark http://www.rtmark.com/ 
30
 Fahimian, see note 28, p. 135. 
31
 Adbusters, http://www.adbusters.org/network/about_us.php. 
32
 Negativland, http://www.negativland.com/. 
33
 Negativland, “Two Relationships to a Cultural Public Domain”, (2003), 66 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 239-262. 
34
 N Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies 2000).  
35
 Ibid, p. xviii. 
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Culture jamming is enjoying a resurgence, in part because of 
technological advancements, but also more pertinently, because of 
the good old rules of supply and demand. Something not far from 
the surface of the public psyche is delighted to see the icons of 
corporate power subverted and mocked. There is, in short, a market 
for it. With commercialism able to overpower the traditional 
authority of religion, politics and schools, corporations have 
emerged as the natural targets for all sorts of free-floating rage and 
rebellion. The new ethos that culture jamming taps into is go-for-
the-corporate jugular.36 
Klein warned against seeing culture jamming as merely an aesthetic practice, without 
political significance or import: “Perhaps the gravest miscalculation on the part of 
both markets and media is the insistence on seeing culture jamming solely as harmless 
satire, a game that exists in isolation from a genuine political movement or 
ideology”.37She notes: “It is simply a tool – one among many – that is being used, 
loaned, and borrowed in a much broader political movement against the branded 
life”.38 
Klein comments that the tactics of culture jamming have been particularly effective 
when targeted against the labour practices of corporations: 
The more ambitious a company has been in branding the cultural 
landscape, and the more careless it has been in abandoning 
workers, the more likely it is to have generated a silent battalion of 
critics waiting to pounce. Moreover, the branding formula leaves 
corporations wide open to the most obvious tactic in the activist 
arsenal: bringing a brand’s production secrets crashing into its 
marketing image. It’s a tactic that has worked before.39 
Klein considers the emergence of the “Fair Trade” movement: “Ethical shareholders, 
culture jammers, street reclaimers, McUnion organizers, human rights hacktivists, 
school-logo fighters and Internet corporate watchdogs are at the early stages of 
demanding a citizen-centered alternative to the international rule of the brands”.40 She 
notes: “That demand, still sometimes in some areas of the world whispered for fear of 
a jinx, is to build a resistance – both high-tech and grassroots, both focused and 
fragmented – that is as global, and as capable of coordinated action, as the 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, p. 287. 
37
 Ibid, p. 309. 
38
 Ibid, p. 309. 
39
 Ibid, p. 345. 
40
 Ibid, p. 445-446. 
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multinational corporations it seeks to subvert.”41 Her subsequent books, Fences and 
Windows, and The Shock Doctrine, further explore the politics of globalization.42 
In her classic text, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, Rosemary Coombe 
discussed "the lure of trademarks as visual symbols of hegemonic power and as 
vehicles for alternative articulations in consumer societies".43  She considered the 
increasing commodification of the public sphere, the branding of cityscapes, the role 
of trade marks in national imagery, struggles around the prohibition of racial 
stereotypes as forms of trade mark, as well as rumours that circulate about the origins 
of trade marks. In “Fear, Hope and Longing for the Future of Authorship and a 
Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property,” Rosemary 
Coombe comments: 
Copyright and trademark are increasingly used as tools of 
corporate harassment and censorship. This is, moreover, no longer 
the position of a few critical legal scholars - the enormous success 
of Naomi Klein's book No Logo (and the anticorporate politics it 
both documents and incites) is evidence that the issue is becoming 
one of widespread social concern (and not just amongst teenagers 
who want free music, as conservative legal theorists dub those who 
are committed to creating alternative moral economies of sharing 
intellectual work, creativity, and democratic dialogue in digital 
environments).44 
Elsewhere, Coombe has remarked: “Protests against sweatshop labour practices, and 
the movement of big box stores and fast food franchises into communities, suggest 
that the trademark now provides a site and a symbol around which to resist forms of 
commodification that people find contrary to their understandings of community and 
social justice”.45 She wonders: “If the trademark serves as a surrogate for the goodwill 
that consumers have towards the company, can we also use them as a means to hold 
corporations accountable for their activities?”46 She poses the question: “To what 
extent are ‘rogue websites,’ ‘culturejamming,’ ‘subvertizing’, and ‘No Logo’ 
movements effective forms of resistance to the hegemony of commodified signs?”47 
                                                 
41
 Ibid, p. 445-446. 
42
 N Klein, Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate. (2002); 
and N Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (2007). 
43
 R Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties:  Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law, 
(1998), p. 130. 
44
 R Coombe, “Fear, Hope and Longing for the Future of Authorship and a Revitalized Public Domain 
in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property”, (2003), 52 DePaul Law Review 1171-1191. 
45
 R Coombe, “The Politics of Intellectual Property”, The Joint Graduate Programme in 
Communication and Culture, http://www.finestone.ca/aa/comcult/faculty/coombe.html. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
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In Freedom of Expression
(R)
, Kembrew McLeod complains about the incursions by 
trademark law into freedom of political speech and artistic expression.48 In 1998, he 
obtained a trade mark from the United States Patent and Trademark Office in respect 
of the phrase "freedom of expression", as an ironic comment to demonstrate how the 
American culture had become commodified and privately owned [Figure 15].49  He 
sought to publicise this event through a media prank.  McLeod hired a lawyer to write 
a cease-and-desist letter to a colleague who was complicit in the joke: 
Your company has been using the mark Freedom of Expression.  
Such use creates a likelihood of confusion in the market and also 
creates substantial risk of harm to the reputation and goodwill of 
our client.  This letter, therefore, constitutes formal notice of your 
infringement of our client's trademark rights and a demand that you 
refrain from all further use of freedom of expression.50 
Dealing with reporters, McLeod observed poker-faced:  "I didn't go to the trouble, 
expense, and the time of trademarking freedom of expression
(R) 
just to have someone 
else come along and think they can use it whenever they want".51  His stooge 
responded that McLeod was an "opportunist".  This staged dispute was reported, with 
great earnestness, by the Hampshire Gazette. This incident has echoes of the 
controversy in Australia over a Melbourne patent attorney, John Keough, obtaining 
innovation patent for a wheel - a "circular transportation device".52 
In Brand Name Bullies, David Bollier is critical of the development of the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act1995 (US), observing: 
The perverse result is that the more power and influence a company 
acquires, the more able it is to stifle robust public discussion about 
it and its products – even where no consumer would be confused. As 
if from the sky, well-heeled trademark holders can figuratively 
deploy a gigantic Monty Python foot to squash unauthorized uses of 
a trademarked name or image, no matter how innocent, non-
commercial, or trivial. All that matters is whether the offending 
reference to the trademark “dilutes” or “tarnishes” it.Often, the 
legal merits of an offending usage may be irrelevant because the 
hapless defendant cannot begin to consider litigation against the 
likes of McDonald’s or Microsoft. This imbalance of power enables 
large trademark holders to make threats they know to be legally 
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dubious or erroneous. Very few of the bullied victims can afford to 
ascertain their rights, let alone fight back in court.53 
Bollier complains that the legislation is a "blunt instrument of cultural intimidation 
and censorship".54  He maintains that "there is no reason that trademark protection 
should trump all other interests in our society, especially free speech and artistic 
commentary".55 
In her paper, “Semiotic Disobedience”, Sonia Katyal notes: “Principles of trademark 
and copyright ownership have allowed corporations to consecrate their symbols and 
images, allowing for a particularly robust form of incontestability”.56 Katyal observes 
that “semiotic disobedience has created new and particularly vexing problems for 
lawyers and law enforcement officials, both of whom are often bemused by artists’ 
increasingly creative and confrontational approaches”.57She seeks to analyse the 
tactics of “semiotic disobedience”: 
Just as previous discussions of civil disobedience focused on the 
need to challenge existing laws by using certain types of public and 
private property for expressive freedoms, today’s generation seeks 
to alter existing intellectual property by interrupting, appropriating, 
and then replacing the passage of information from creator to 
consumer. In many cases, the object of artistic attention is the 
appropriation and occupation of intellectual, tangible, or even 
bodily property. I call these recent artistic practices examples of 
‘semiotic disobedience’ because they often involve the conscious 
and deliberate re-creation of property through appropriative and 
expressive acts that consciously risk violating the law that governs 
intellectual or tangible property.58 
Katyal maintains that “semiotic disobedience offers a cautionary lesson for 
intellectual property enforcement: as law attempts to suppress creativity, it may also 
give rise to an even more innovative process of comment and criticism than was 
previously imagined.”59 
2.2 The Pro Logo Counter-Movement 
Against this new genre of cultural criticism of advertising and marketing, there has 
been a rearguard defence of the value and integrity of trade marks.  
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In response to the Naomi Klein book No Logo, The Economist magazine released a 
special edition on branding entitled Pro Logo, with the tag line "Why brands are good 
for you".60  Its front cover is a replication of the cover of the book “No Logo”, with 
“No” replaced with “Pro” and the tag line “Why brands are good for you” [Figure 16]. 
The Economist attacks Naomi Klein's book No Logo as the representative of a wider 
anti-branding movement. 
Brands have thus become stalking horses for international 
capitalism.  Outside the United States, they are now symbols of 
America's corporate power, since most of the world's best known 
brands are American.   Around them accrete all the worries about 
environmental damage, human-rights abuses and sweated labour 
that anti-globalists like to put on their placards.  No wonder brands 
seem bad.61 
First, The Economist defends trade marks in terms of their original objectives:   
"[Brands] began as a form not of exploitation, but of consumer protection ".62 Second, 
The Economist offers a defence of trade marks, with the case statement: "Far from 
being instruments of oppression, they make firms accountable to consumers".63 The 
editorial notes: “A failed advertising campaign, a drop-off in quality or a hint of 
scandal can all quickly send customers fleeing".64 The leader states: "Indeed, 
protestors, including Ms Klein's anti-globalisation supporters, can use the power of 
the brand against companies by drumming up evidence of workers ill-treated or rivers 
polluted.”65Third, The Economist accuses Naomi Klein of claiming that consumers are 
merely pawns: “Her thesis is that brands have come to represent 'a fascist state where 
we all salute the logo and have little opportunity for criticism because our 
newspapers, television stations, Internet servers, streets and retail spaces are 
controlled by multinational corporate interests.'”.66 The Economist concludes that 
Naomi Klein’s arguments are wrong-headed: “The idea is utterly wrong-headed. 
Brands do not rule consumers; consumers rule brands.”67 
Taking umbrage at the piece, Naomi Klein wrote a letter to The Economist 
complaining that her views had been misrepresented and placed out of context.68 She 
scornfully replied: “Your publication, on the other hand, appears to believe that 
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political activism is unnecessary since we apparently can rid the world of corporate 
abuses simply by shopping for better brands.”69 
In Pro Logo, a pair of Gallic marketeers, Michel Chevalier and Gerald Mazzalovo, 
sought to rebut the notion that brands are inherently evil; that they are the foundation 
of a system of hegemony and alienation; and that, by attacking them, one is attacking 
the heart of the "capitalist machine" [Figure 17].70  Indeed the writers contend that 
brands are authentic indicia of social progress: 
Brands exist and are neither good nor evil in themselves. They can 
be criticized, but calling for their abolition is absurd. They are and 
will remain an essential tool of marketing, international 
competition, and contemporary social life. It’s impossible to 
imagine that supermarkets would suddenly begin selling exclusively 
generic products.  If that were to happen, the need for 
differentiating these products would immediately arise – and brands 
would reappear, or else the store’s name would take their place. In 
fact, there is no such thing as a world without brands.71 
Chevalier and Mazzalovo conclude that “brands are a force for progress to the degree 
that they are well managed and that the consumer behaves responsibly.”72 The authors 
seek to “convince consumers determined to defend their rights that brands are not The 
Enemy, and companies that they have everything to gain by making their customers’ 
point of view a priority.”73 
It is perhaps worth interpolating that certain social movements have relied upon trade 
marks to promote progressive social causes. Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International uses Fairtrade marks to provide an independent guarantee that 
disadvantaged producers in the developing world are benefiting from the sale of 
goods.74 A product can only display the Fairtrade mark if it meets international 
Fairtrade standards. The “Make Poverty History” campaign was designed to promote 
trade justice, humanitarian aid and the reduction of debt.75 The name and logo “Make 
Poverty History” was registered as a trade mark by Comic Relief, and licensed to 
member organisations who met certain guidelines as to the use of the brand. “(Red)” 
is a brand created to raise awareness and money for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria by teaming up with the world's most iconic brands to 
                                                 
69
Ibid. 
70
 M Chevalier, G Mazzalovo, Pro Logo:  Brands as a Factor of Progress, (2004).  
71
 Ibid, p. 3. 
72
 Ibid. p. 4 
73
 Ibid, p. 5. 
74
 Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International, http://www.fairtrade.net/. See also R Layton 
“Enhancing Intellectual Property Exports Through Fair Trade”, in J M Finger and P Schuler, Poor 
People’s Knowledge: Promoting Intellectual Property in Developing Countries (2004), p. 75-94; and 
S Courville, “Use of Indicators to Compare Supply Chains in the Coffee Industry”, (2004), 43 Greener 
Management International 93-105.  
75
 Make Poverty History, http://www.makepovertyhistory.org/.  
 (2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
 
85 
produce “(Red)”branded products. A portion of profits from each product sold goes 
directly to the fund to invest in African AIDS programs, with a focus on women and 
children.76 The various initiatives of “Fairtade”, “Make Poverty History” and “(Red)” 
all use and deploy trade marks to advertise and raise awareness for certain progressive 
causes. The ventures can be contrasted with the tactics of culture jamming, which 
seek to undermine trade marks in order to promote social and political causes. 
In The Rebel Sell:  Why the Culture Can't Be Jammed, Joseph Heath and Andrew 
Potter engaged in a critique of the culture jamming strategies of Naomi Klein, 
Adbusters, and Michael Moore [Figure 18].77   The authors observe:  "In a world of 
this type, countercultural rebellion is not just unhelpful, it is positively 
counterproductive".78 Heath and Potter comment: 
Books like No Logo, magazines like Adbusters and movies like 
American Beauty do not undermine consumerism; they reinforce it. 
This isn’t because the authors, editors or directors are hypocrites. 
It’s because they’ve failed to understand the true nature of 
consumer society. They identify consumerism with conformity. As a 
result, they fail to notice that it is rebellion, not conformity, that has 
for decades been the driving force of the marketplace.79 
The authors maintain that Naomi Klein offers little in the way of a positive, 
constructive, political agenda: “One of the biggest ironies of the anti-globalization 
movement in general is that for all its opposition to consumerism, it effectively 
reduces citizenship to consumer action”.80 Heath and Potter observe, acerbically: “The 
reason No Logo has had such dramatic success is that it serves as a how-to manual for 
the virtuously hip shopper, full of case studies in how consumers can try to influence 
corporate behaviour”.81 The pair lament that Klein “focuses entirely on corporate 
awareness campaigns, consumer boycotts, street protests, and culture jamming, while 
completely ignoring the role played by citizens working through government”.82 
The scholar of academic publishing, Simone Murray, comments that the book No 
Logo is itself open to being co-opted:  
Canadian journalist Naomi Klein's handbook of the anti-corporate 
movement, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies (2000), was 
published in Australia and the UK by News Corporation subsidiary 
HarperCollins and has, perhaps even to its publisher's surprise, 
achieved bestseller status internationally. Yet, the exceptionalism of 
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this text's print history in the current media environment tends 
rather to confirm the dominant publishing industry rule that 
individual media products reinforce the market profile of their 
parent corporation. There may well be leeway for abstract critique 
of the political and economic philosophies to which the company's 
directors subscribe, but rarely for explicit and extended criticism of 
the corporation's activities per se.83 
She notes the ironies of No Logo being marketed by a publisher under the ownership 
of the powerful News Corporation: ‘Explicitly oppositional books are always 
themselves open to commodification in a marketplace hungry for new ideas and 
willing to pay for them’.84 
The ebullient Jeremy Phillips devotes a whole chapter of his scholarly text, Trade 
Mark Law: A Practical Anatomy, to a rejoinder to the “No Logo” thesis of Naomi 
Klein.85 The section is entitled “Trade marks, Images, Icons and Social 
Responsibility”. Phillips responds to the manifesto of “No Logo” thus: 
Naomi Klein’s anxieties concerning the power and influence of 
major brands are not misplaced, but the abuses which she addresses 
are not confined to owners: they are found within large 
corporations of many descriptions. The rectification of those abuses 
is not the exclusive province of the trade mark and brand-protection 
community. While it helps to protect brand manipulators by 
granting them a powerful exclusive right, that same body of law 
provides for a wide range of defences to infringement in the 
interests of freedom of speech, competition and honest use. 86 
Phillips contended that Klein's case did not relate to the misfeasance of all brand 
owners in respect of all brands.  Rather, he emphasized that the target of her criticism 
was a small number of brand-mighty corporate potentate. Phillips doubted whether 
the “consumer apocalypse” or “Armageddon” predicted by Klein would in fact 
eventuate.87 
2.3 Culture Wars 
It is useful to contextualise the dispute over the appropriation of the Carling Black 
Label mark in the context of wider debates over trade mark law, culture jamming, and 
the No Logo anti-global capitalism movement. The dispute between Laugh It Off 
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Promotions and the brewers of Carling Black is part of a larger struggle over well-
known and famous trade marks. In this context, there has been an intense discussion 
over the value and worth of trade marks. Trade mark owners and their legal 
representatives, economists, and marketing agents have defended the value of trade 
marks, saying that they fulfil their original aims and objectives. Thus, they have 
maintained that trade marks serve as a badge of origin of goods and services; they 
guarantee the quality of goods and services; and promote consumer welfare.88 By 
contrast, the No Logo movement has emphasized the economic, social and cultural 
costs associated with the expansive protection of trade marks.  The civil society 
activists complain that corporations have deployed trade marks to mesmerize and 
indoctrinate consumers. There has been much debate over the legitimacy of the tactics 
and strategies of culture jamming, “adbusting”, and the No Logo Movement. The 
owners of well-known and famous trade marks would maintain that such conduct 
constitutes trade mark infringement and dilution. The No Logo movement would 
justify such methods of resistance as a form of “semiotic disobedience.” There has 
also been larger debate about the political intentions and motivations of the No Logo 
movement. Trade mark owners have questioned the political efficacy of culture 
jamming, suggesting that it does as much to reinforce consumer capitalism, as critique 
it. The No Logo movement maintains that the appropriation of well-known and 
famous marks is a useful means of promoting fair trade. 
3. Black Labour, White Guilt 
South Africa has suffered so many interferences with the rights of 
free speech that the tendency to let everybody say what they want, 
when they want, how they want is very strong.  At the same time 
there is an awareness that racism can ignite explosive passions and 
destroy the very fabric of a tolerant and democratic society...  The 
problem, then, is how to reconcile the need for openness and the 
right to speak one's mind with the necessity for healing the wounds 
created by racism. 
Justice Albie Sachs
89
 
The South African Breweries sued Laugh It Off Promotions under South Africa’s 
anti-dilution trade mark laws. Section 34 (1) (c) of the Trade Marks Act 1993 (RSC) 
provides that the rights acquired by registration of a trade mark are infringed by "the 
unauthorized use in the course of trade in relation to any goods or services of a mark 
which is identical or similar to a trade mark registered, if such trade mark is well 
known in the Republic and the use of the said mark would be likely to take unfair 
advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the 
registered trade mark, notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception." 
The directors of the company, JaapRomein, and Graham Holford, observed in papers 
tended to the court: 
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We take particular objection to the wording on their label... We 
have worked extremely hard to avoid racial discrimination in our 
labour practices, to the extent the SAB has recently received 
recognition as the best employer in South Africa. The mark applied 
to clothing by Laugh It Off is undoubtedly intended to suggest that 
improper racial discrimination is a factor in the business of SAB 
and to harm our reputation and the reputation of Black Label marks 
and products. It is distasteful and undesirable.90 
South African Breweries was concerned that the racial slur was likely to erode the 
exclusiveness of the mark, discourage people from purchasing the respondent’s Black 
Label Beer and adversely curtail its opportunities to sponsor domestic sport. 
In response, Laugh It Off Promotions contended that its use of the trade marks had not 
infringed the anti-dilution provisions because the likelihood of detriment to the 
reputation of the marks had not been established.  In any case, the group maintained 
that it was exercising freedom of expression protected by the South African 
Constitution 1996 (RSC).  Section 16 (1) of the South African Constitution 1996 
(RSC) provides:  "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which 
includes– (a) freedom of the press and other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart 
information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) academic freedom and 
freedom of scientific research."  Section 16 (2) of the South African Constitution1996 
(RSC) provides:  "The right in subsection (1) does not extend to – (a) propaganda for 
war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on 
race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.” 
The advocate for Laugh It Off, Peter Hodes, argued:  "We are dealing here with a 
form of creative expression ... that should endure protection by the constitutional right 
to freedom of expression".91  He submitted that South African Breweries had not 
succeeded in proving that the shirts caused the brewery economic harm:  "If you want 
to limit someone’s freedom of expression, you will have to establish economic 
harm."92 Hodes maintained that the T-Shirt conveyed a social comment, rather than a 
racial attack on South African:  "It says nothing about beer, about SAB or about their 
labour practices."93 Hodes also argued that freedom of expression should be 
considered a more important right than protecting intellectual property rights. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court of South Africa admitted 
the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) as an amicus curiae, a friend of the court 
The FXI observed that South African Breweries should tolerate some criticism and 
mockery because the brewery has “opted to place a particular brand identity with 
certain images, virtues and values in the public domain”.94  In a statement, FXI 
observed: 
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SAB must not enjoy special immunity from the spoofing and 
criticism that is generated by its own choice of branding.  The 
words 'Black Labour - White Guilt' are a parody and constitute 
nothing more than the fair use of a registered trademark, which is 
protected by the constitutional right to freedom of expression.  The 
right to parody is one of the hallmarks of the right to freedom of 
expression and in order for parody to be exercised effectively, an 
individual must be able to borrow, copy or imitate an original work, 
mark or object.95 
FXI stated that the case is also about the relation between trade mark law and freedom 
of expression:  "We accept there cannot be an a priori hierarchy."96  FXI maintained 
that the form of the communication was acceptable:  "It lies in the essence of freedom 
of expression that it includes the freedom to choose the means of communication."97   
FXI noted:  "In the 21st century we do not shout messages from rooftops or hang 
them on lamp posts."98  The FXI submitted that trade mark dilution law should allow 
parody as an instance of "fair use" in the light of the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression. 
This section considers how a succession of South African courts have interpreted the 
transgressive image of the "Black Labour, White Guilt" T-shirt.  It highlights the 
range of hermeneutic strategies that were deployed to make sense of this unstable, 
ambiguous icon.  Indeed, the "Black Labour, White Guilt" T-Shirt proved to be a 
Rorschach ink blot for judicial methodologies.   It first considers the "Pro Logo" 
approach of the High Court of South Africa, and the Supreme Court of Appeal to the 
"Black Labour, White Guilt" T-shirts.  Such lower courts maintained that the 
appropriation of the mark was an instance of "hate speech", and an abuse of freedom 
of speech.  It secondly evaluates the judgment of Moseneke J in the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa that trade mark dilution requires economic or material harm.  It 
also examines the jurist's reluctance to address wider constitutional issues.  It finally 
examines the judgment of Sachs J in the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and his 
discussion of the importance of parody, laughter, and freedom of expression.  
3.1 The High Court of South Africa (the Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) 
The litigation in the High Court of South Africa (the Cape of Good Hope Provincial 
Division) attracted a great deal of media attention – with the supporters of Laugh It 
Off Promotions staging colourful protests outside the court. 
In the course of argument, the advocate for South African Breweries, Philip Ginsberg, 
SC, alleged that Laugh It Off Promotions had tarnished the Carling Black Label trade 
marks: 
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His [Nurse’s] purpose is to create something that is controversial, 
eye-catching and sells T-shirts. This is shown by his other T-shirts 
that range from pornographic to derogative.  The message of Laugh 
It Off is degrading and racially inflammatory, and it cannot be seen 
as humour or a parody.  The purpose of the message is to attract 
attention in order to sell T-shirts and make money at the expense of 
someone else’s property.  If you allow T-shirts now, it will be mugs 
tomorrow. Inevitably, it will be everywhere and it will be the death 
of the trademark.99 
South African Breweries was concerned that the racial slur was likely to erode the 
exclusiveness of the mark, discourage people from purchasing the respondent’s Black 
Label Beer and adversely curtail its opportunities to sponsor domestic sport. 
At first instance, the High Court of South Africa (the Cape of Good Hope Provincial 
Division) considered the claims of South African Breweries that the words used on 
the T-Shirts conveyed the message that "the applicant has, in the past, exploited and 
continues deliberately to exploit black labour and is guilty of racial discrimination."100  
It was furthermore alleged:  "The words used conjure up South Africa’s racist past by 
falsely attributing to the applicant the “Lusty” and “lively exploitation of Black 
Labour since 1652”."101  It was submitted that such messages were racially 
inflammatory. 
The High Court of South Africa held that the message on the T-shirts carried a 
likelihood of material detriment to the distinctive character or repute of the marks.  
Cleaver J considered that Laugh It Off Promotions could not raise the defence of free 
expression because they had exploited the marks for gain:  "The dividing line between 
the freedom of speech and the statutory protection afforded the applicant is a thin one, 
but is nonetheless one which has been transgressed by the respondent."102  The High 
Court held that the use of the marks was not mere parody that poked fun at the trade 
marks.  Rather, it intimated that the publication engaged in "hate speech": 
Its lampooning or parodying of the applicant’s marks is not a 
“harmless clean pun which merely parodies or pokes fun” at the 
respondent’s marks.  It goes further than that by introducing the 
race factor, something which our Constitution and our new 
democracy are at pains to avoid.  While the respondent’s use of the 
marks may not amount to hate speech as contemplated in sections 
16 (2) (c) of the Constitution, it can, I believe, be said to border on 
hate speech.  The provisions of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, No 4 of 2000 highlight the 
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importance which the legislature places on eliminating racial 
friction.103 
The judge concluded:  "In my view the use by the respondent of the applicant’s marks 
can be said to demonstrate an intention to be hurtful or harmful to the applicant 
inasmuch as they are based on race, ethnic or social origin, and colour."104 
The decision for the High Court shows an antipathy towards culture jamming. First, 
the judgment suggests that Laugh It Off Promotions is contemptuous of law. It 
suggests that the T-shirts show a wilful disobedience and disrespect for the authority 
of the court. Second, the ruling maintains that the T-shirts display more than mere bad 
taste; there are a form of hate speech. The decision suggests that Laugh It Off 
Promotions is a purveyor of racial taunts and ethnic slurs. Third, the judgment shows 
no sympathy or understanding for the cultural modes of production used by Laugh It 
Off Promotions. The decision suggests that the work of the agent provocateurs shows 
bad taste and poor artistic standards, which do not meet the high standards of puns, 
parodies, and fun. Finally, the language of the decision shows a peculiar 
anthropomorphism. The judge attributes to a corporate entity – South African 
Breweries – hurt feelings and a wounded disposition. The phrase “hate speech” is 
usually directed towards groups and collectives – rather than a corporate entity. 
Arguably, this is a peculiar misreading of the facts of the case. It would seem to be a 
distortion of the controversy to view it as an aggressive racist attack by Laugh It Off 
Promotions upon the delicate sensibilities of a helpless corporation. 
3.2 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
The Supreme Court of Appeal considered the arguments of Laugh It Off Promotions 
and FXI that the message was a parody of Sabmark’s trade marks and, as such, 
entitled to freedom of expression protection.105  In the course of the appeal, Harms JA 
considered comparative law on trade mark law and freedom of expression:  "Although 
reliance will be placed in the course of this judgment on foreign case law it must be 
understood that it is done principally in order to illustrate or to compare."106With such 
caveats in mind, the judge considered legal developments on trade mark law and 
parody in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. 
After this somewhat selective review of the comparative case law on trade mark law 
and parody, the Supreme Court of Appeal doubted whether the T-Shirts of Laugh It 
Off Promotions qualified as "fair parody".  The judge observed: 
Mr Nurse, who should know, ironically enough, described his use as 
satire and not as parody. MrWelz, the editor of Noseweek who filed 
an affidavit in support of Nurse, was able to give a number of 
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examples of true parody of trade marks as used in his publication. 
And as counsel for FXI accepted during argument, some of the 
appellant’s other caricatures can be classified as parody and others 
not.107 
The judge held that the appellant’s reliance on parody as a defence was misconceived:  
"The appellant is using the reputation of Sabmark’s well-known trade mark, which 
has been established at considerable expense over a lengthy period of time, in the 
course of trade in relation to goods to the detriment of the repute of the mark without 
any justification."108  The judge concluded that the use and detriment was unfair and 
constituted an infringement of the trade mark dilution provisions. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the mark on the T-shirts conveyed the 
message that Sabmark was guilty of exploiting black labour and of racial 
discrimination, and that the message is likely to take unfair advantage or cause 
detriment to the trade marks.   The judge acknowledged that a T-shirt could be a 
vehicle for political communication: 
One should recognise that in latter-day societies one-liners, sound 
bytes and SMS messages have become the favourite method of 
communication, replacing political, religious and social 
monographs and tracts. T-shirts fall in the same class and provide a 
powerful medium for making socio-political comments. As PJ 
O’Rourke once remarked somewhat sardonically –‘If Martin Luther 
were a modern ecologist, he would have to nail ninety-five T-shirts 
to the church door at Wittenberg.’109 
The judge noted that "courts are in general not amused by sex- and drug-related 
‘parodies’, even if they are clever or funny, simply because the prejudice to the trade 
mark tends to outweigh freedom of expression.
"110 His Honour also observed:  "On the 
same principle, unfair or unjustified racial slurs on a trademark owner (even if not 
hate speech or approximating it) should in general not be countenanced, more so in a 
society such as ours."111   The judge concluded that the constitutional right to freedom 
of expression did not protect Laugh It Off Promotions because it fed off the reputation 
of the trade mark in order to sell T-shirts, and could still express itself in other ways 
that do not harm Sabmark.  His Honour noted:  "The appellant’s reliance on the 
freedom of expression is misplaced. It did not exercise its freedom, it abused it."112 
The judgment was received with acclaim by some commentators. Writing in the 
European Intellectual Property Review, Dario F. Tanziani enthused: 
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This is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal which 
sets out the limits to freedom of speech in using a trade mark to 
criticise the activities of the trade mark proprietor. Not only did the 
court set out limits to what would normally be regarded as parody 
or satire, but much emphasis was placed on the fact that Sabmark's 
trade marks were used by the infringer in relation to goods or 
services and in the course of trade.113 
The suggestion here is that Laugh It Off Promotions merely used the guise or 
semblance of parody and satire to engage in commercial activities. 
However, the "Pro Logo" reasoning of the Supreme Court of Appeal can be criticised 
on a number of grounds.  
First, the lower courts are too quick to accept that the "Black Labour, White Guilt" T-
shirt tarnishes and dilutes the trade mark, without any firm evidence of economic or 
material harm. It is unclear how the corporate behemoth of South African Breweries 
has been harmed by the T-Shirt released by Laugh It Off Promotions. There is no 
evidence that the parody has resulted in a diminution in the sales of alcohol to South 
African consumers. Moreover, the judges tend to be selective in their reading of 
international precedents, ignoring the clear trend towards providing a safe harbour for 
parodies under trade mark law.  
Second, the judges are rather prim and puritanical in misreading the T-shirt as a racial 
slur, without any qualities of humour or parody. It could be questioned whether the T-
shirt produced by Laugh It Off Promotions constitutes “hate speech”.114 The academic, 
Katharine Gelber, has sought to explain the phenomenon of “hate speech”: 
Hate speech enacts hatred, not just a psychological dislike for 
another human being but a manifestation of prejudice; systematic 
and institutionalised marginalisation which can be identified via 
considerable historical evidence. The ‘hate’ in hate speech is 
shorthand for a broader conception. Thus hate speech enacts 
prejudice in complex ways, and with concrete negative 
consequences for its targets. Subjected to an assessment of the 
operative principle of what it is that an expressive activity does in 
the saying of it, the minefield of whose free speech claims may be 
regarded as valid, and whose may not, becomes easier to navigate. 
Difficult cases, and differences of opinion, will always arise. But the 
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primary consideration ought to be a measure of the impact of one’s 
expressive activities on oneself and others.115 
In light of such a definition, it is difficult to accept that the T-Shirt disseminated by 
Laugh It Off Promotions is an instance of “hate speech” designed to enact racial 
hatred. It also appears to be very strange to characterise criticism of a corporation as 
“hate speech”, and attribute to such an entity hurt and wounded feelings. It would be 
more accurate to say that the South African Breweries are complaining of so-called 
“corporate libel” and “product disparagement”.116 It is not clear that trade mark law 
should provide such collateral protection for corporate reputation. 
Third, the Supreme Court of Appeal tended to crudely define the cultural production 
of Laugh It Off Promotions. The judges draw a binary opposition between “parody” 
and “satire”. The Supreme Court of Appeal suggests that “parody” – or at least “fair 
parody” is acceptable, because it involves the criticism of the trade mark itself. 
However, in its view, “satire” is not acceptable, because it involves larger political 
and social commentary. The judges seem to accept that the arguments of the South 
African Breweries that the particular T-shirt in question is something less than a 
“parody”; but might constitute a “satire”. Confusingly, the judges accepted the 
argument of the South African Breweries that some of the appellant’s other 
caricatures can be classified as parody and others not. Such quibbling, pettifogging 
reasoning is questionable. Scholars have shown that there are strong inter-connections 
between the practices of “parody” and “satire”.117 Margaret Rose notes that “there are 
several distinct differences between parody and satire – such as the way in which the 
parody may make its target contribute to its own text – but that parody may be used 
by the satirist to attack an author or reader through the evocation and mockery of a 
particular work with which they may be associated.”118 In any case, it is arguable that 
“satire” is more deserving of protection as free speech because of its political content. 
A larger concern is that the terminology of “parody” and “satire” seems aesthetically 
distant and remote from the cultural practices of culture jamming. There is a failure 
on the part of the Supreme Court of Appeal to comprehend the aesthetic tradition of 
culture jamming and “adbusting” that Laugh It Off Promotions is working in. 
Finally, the lower courts wrongly give short shrift to constitutional protections of 
freedom of expression in their analysis. Eric Barendt has complained about the 
tendency of courts to avoid dealing with the constitutional ramifications of intellectual 
property rights: “These areas of law have developed apart from free speech 
jurisprudence”.
119
 He maintains: “No historical or doctrinal account can justify the 
immunity of these rights from careful free speech scrutiny.”
120
Similarly, Neil Netanel 
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has noted similar tendencies at work in the field of copyright law.
121
 He comments 
that copyright law has failed to be an “engine of free expression”: “Copyright’s 
speech burdens cut a wide swath, chilling core political speech such as news reporting 
and political commentary, as well as church dissent, historical scholarship, cultural 
critique, artistic expression, and quotidian entertainment”.
122
 There is a need to 
subject intellectual property rights to much greater constitutional scrutiny as to their 
impact upon freedom of speech. The scope, nature and character of intellectual 
property rights should be shaped according to its impact upon the constitutional goals 
of “robust debate and expressive diversity”.
123
 
3.3 The Constitutional Court of South Africa 
In Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa upheld the appeal by Laugh It Off Promotions 
against the decisions of the lower courts that it had committed trade mark dilution.124 
Moseneke J wrote the lead judgment for the unanimous Constitutional Court of South 
Africa. There is a supplementary judgment from Sachs J. Although respectful of the 
judgment of Moseneke J, his Honour believed that the decision failed to grasp some 
of the substantive matters at hand:  "I believe that when balancing the different 
interests involved it failed to appreciate why the parodic use of the trademark in the 
milieu in which Laugh it Off operated was central to its critical project."125 The 
Constitutional Court of South Africa considered four key issues: the role of trade 
mark dilution protection; the need for evidence of material harm; the nature of culture 
jamming; and the ramifications of constitutional protection of freedom of speech. 
First, the judges considered the history and nature of trade mark dilution as a legal 
doctrine. 
Moseneke J observes that the dilution of a trade mark can occur in two ways, by 
blurring or by tarnishment. He notes:  "Blurring takes place when the distinctive 
character or inherent uniqueness of the trade mark is weakened or reduced."126 By 
contrast, he observes:  "Tarnishment occurs where unfavourable associations are 
created between a well-known registered trade mark and the mark of the unauthorised 
user."127 Moseneke J commented that the South African provisions similar were to 
those found in the European Directive,128 United Kingdom trade mark law,129 and the 
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United States Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US).130However, there was one 
important difference.  The South African legislation required a likelihood of unfair 
advantage or detriment - rather than proof of actual detriment or unfair advantage. 
In his judgment, Sachs J recognises the social importance of trade mark protection.  
He cites the words of Frankfurter J, "The protection of trade-marks is the law’s 
recognition of the psychological function of symbols."
131
 Sachs J comments: 
From the producer’s side, trademarks promote invention, protect 
investment and enhance market-share by securely identifying a 
product or service. From the consumer’s point of view, they 
facilitate choice by identifying the product and guaranteeing its 
provenance and presumed quality. Furthermore, although this case 
has been presented as a David and Goliath contest, it is not only the 
Goliaths of this world who need trademark protection. Small 
entrepreneurs fighting to increase their share of the market against 
the Goliaths strive energetically to identify their uniqueness and 
that of their products and services.132 
His Honour observed:  "In a society driven by consumerism and material symbols, 
trademarks have become important marketing and commercial tools that occupy a 
prominent place in the public mind."133 The judge commented: "Consequently, 
companies and producers of consumer goods invest substantial sums of money to 
develop, publicise and protect the distinctive nature of their trademarks; in the 
process, well-known trademarks become targets for parody."134 
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Second, the judges questioned whether South African Breweries had provided 
sufficient evidence of material harm, which could be attributed to the T-shirts of 
Laugh It Off Promotions. 
Citing the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Moseley v. Victoria'sSecret 
Catalogue, Inc,135 Moseneke J emphasized that "in order to succeed the owner of the 
mark bears the onus to demonstrate likelihood of substantial harm or detriment which, 
seen within the context of the case, amounts to unfairness."136 Moseneke J comments 
that the evidence that there had been material detriment in this particular case was 
weak: 
It is appropriate to observe that the mere fact that the expressive act 
may indeed stir discomfort in some and appear to be morally 
reprobate or unsavoury to others is not ordinarily indicative of a 
breach of section 34(1)(c). Such a moral or other censure is an 
irrelevant consideration if the expression enjoys protection under 
the Constitution. Of course freedom of expression is not boundless 
but may not be limited in a manner other than authorised by the 
Constitution itself such as by the law of defamation. The 
constitutional guarantee of free expression is available to all under 
the sway of our Constitution, even where others may deem the 
expression unsavoury, unwholesome or degrading. To that extent 
ordinarily such meaning should enjoy protection as fair use and 
should not amount to tarnishment of the trade marks.137 
His Honour comments that "in a claim under section 34 (1) (c), a party that seeks to 
oust an expressive conduct protected under the Constitution must, on the facts, 
establish a likelihood of substantial economic detriment to the claimant’s mark."138   
The judge stressed the need for economic and trade harm:  "In essence the protection 
is against detriment to the repute of the mark; and not against the dignity but the 
selling magnetism of the mark."139  The judge noted:  "In an open democracy valuable 
expressive acts in public ought not to be lightly trampled upon by marginal detriment 
or harm unrelated to the commercial value that vests in the mark itself."140 
Considering the facts of the case, Moseneke J commented: “There is not even the 
slightest suggestion that, from the time the T-shirts saw the light of day to the date the 
interdict proceedings were launched, there had been a real possibility of a reduction of 
its market dominance or compromised beer sales”.141 
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Sachs J agrees with the central proposition of the lead judgment - "namely, that in the 
context of our country's free speech values SAB have failed to prove the likelihood of 
any appreciable detriment to the marketability of their beer."142 The judge considers 
the argument that the imputation of racist labour practices in the past would tarnish 
the goodwill associated with the trade mark thereby creating unfair detriment.  His 
Honour doubts that the sale of the T-Shirts had a negative impact upon the image of 
the Carling Black Label: “There is no proof whatsoever that imputations of racist 
labour practices in the past by SAB would in any way affect the eagerness of present 
day customers to down another glass of Carling Black Label”.143 The judge observed 
ruefully: “There is hardly an institution in South Africa that has not in the recent 
period been accused of being associated in one way or another with racist 
practices”.144 Indeed, the judge noted that the evidence suggested that the small 
community of media-literate purchasers acquired the T-shirt precisely because it 
poked fun at enterprises considered as taking themselves too seriously:  "The game in 
which they participated was one of vivacious word-play, not solemn social history."145   
The judge concluded:  "The Laugh it Off campaign was to get them to laugh, not to 
hate; and laugh, it appears, is what they did."146 
Third, the judges discussed whether the cultural content of the Laugh It Off 
Promotions T-Shirt was relevant to a determination of trade mark infringement and 
dilution. 
Moseneke J observed that parody is a relevant factor in determining whether the use 
of a work is fair within the meaning of section 34 (1) (c) but not an absolute defence 
to a claim of infringement of a trade mark.  He considered whether the message on the 
T-Shirt was an unjustified racial slur, or a justified parody.  Moseneke J considered 
the competing interpretative meanings given to the protest: 
The difficult issue is whether the interpretation of the offending 
message in this case yields more than one plausible meaning. 
Before us the respondent argued that like the SCA this Court must 
grasp the nettle and support only one plausible meaning of the 
message. The applicant and the amicus argue that the message 
lends itself to at least one other reasonable meaning being that the 
statement is a critical but parodic comment on the methods used by 
SAB to market its beer by targeting male workers and in particular 
black male workers and should therefore be protected as fair use 
under section 34 (1) (c) read with the Constitution. 147 
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However, Moseneke J refrained from making any finding on the question of the fair 
use of a trade mark under section 34 (1) (c) and freedom of expression.  His Honour 
observed that it was unnecessary to consider the fairness of the parody or the satire 
because "no likelihood of economic prejudice has been established."148  The judge 
concluded:  "It must always be kept in mind that, unlike in the US, in our 
jurisprudence there are no enclaves of protected expression such as parody or satire 
and therefore the mere characterisation of an expression as such would not be decisive 
of what is fair use under our anti-dilution protection of section 34(1)(c) because 
ordinarily all categories of expression, save those excluded by the Constitution itself, 
enjoy constitutional shield and may be restricted only in a way constitutionally 
authorised."149 
By contrast, Sachs J is much more appreciative of the cultural practices of culture 
jamming. Sachs J argued that the earlier decisions had "over-emphasised the fact that 
the T-shirts were sold at a profit" and at the same time "gave far too little regard to the 
uniquely expressive weight of the parodic form used".150 Sachs J notes:  "At the heart 
of this matter lies the legal dilemma posed by the fact that Laugh it Off utilised the 
SAB brand, not adventitiously, but deliberately and precisely in order to challenge 
SAB’s use of branding".151  His Honour recognised that Laugh It Off "employed the 
enemy’s brand to denounce the power of branding in general, and to confront the 
employment of trademark law, in our country as elsewhere, to suppress free 
speech."152The judge noted:  "There is nothing in our law to suggest that parody is a 
separate defence."153  Rather, in his view, it was a factor that should be considered as 
an element in the overall analysis. Citing the United States Court of Appeals decision 
in Dr Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books,154Sachs J observed:  "Parody, like any 
other use, has to work its way through the relevant factors and be judged case by case, 
in light of the ends of trademark law and the free speech values of the 
Constitution."155His Honour observes that an independent observer must "say that the 
harm done by the parody to the property interests of the trademark owner outweighs 
the free speech interests involved."156The judge held:  "The fact that the comedian is 
paid and the newspaper and T-shirts are sold, does not in itself convert the expression 
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involved into a mere commodity."157  He noted that Laugh It Off Promotions "chose 
parody as a means, and invited young acolytes to join their gadfly laughter."158 
Finally, the judges considered the relationship between anti-dilution protection and 
freedom of expression.  
Moseneke J emphasized that the litigation in this matter was not a frivolous matter: 
The interplay between free expression and intellectual property in 
the form of trade marks is not merely academic.  It is a matter that 
has important and abiding implications for the workings of our 
economy and is of concern to the broader public.159 
His Honour highlights the key constitutional issue at play in the litigation:  "This case 
brings to the fore the novel, and rather vexed, matter of the proper interface between 
the guarantee of free expression enshrined in section 16 (1) of the Constitution and the 
protection of intellectual property rights attaching to registered trade marks as 
envisaged by section 34 (1) (c) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993."160 The judge 
favoured a construction of trade mark law, which was compatible with the right to 
free expression: “The anti-dilution provision must bear a meaning which is the least 
destructive of other entrenched rights and in this case free expression rights”.161 The 
judge cites with approval the earlier decision in Klimax Manufacturing Ltd v. 
VanResnburg162 which emphasized that the new trade mark dilution laws must be 
interpreted, so “that the legitimate interests of proprietors of well-known trade marks 
are protected while, at the same time, not creating an absolute monopoly or a form of 
copyright in a trade mark.”163 
In his judgment, Sachs J expressed concern from a constitutional point of view that 
even the threat of litigation can stifle legitimate debate.  He notes that companies have 
a significant power advantage in such conflicts because of their access to wealth, the 
media, and the government:  “The companies that own famous trademarks exert 
substantial influence over public and political issues, making them and their marks 
ripe and appropriate targets for parody and criticism.”164  Sachs J comments: 
Yet when applied against non-competitor parody artists, the 
tarnishment theory of trademark dilution may in protecting the 
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reputation of a mark’s owner, effectively act as a defamation 
statute. As such it, could serve as an over-deterrent. It could chill 
public discourse because trademark law could be used to encourage 
prospective speakers to engage in undue self-censorship to avoid 
the negative consequence of speaking – namely, being involved in a 
ruinous lawsuit. The cost could be inordinately high for an 
individual faced with a lawsuit aimed at silencing a critic, not only 
in terms of general litigation expenses, but also through the 
disruption of families and emotional upheaval. Such protracted 
vexation can have the effect of discouraging even the hardiest of 
souls from exercising their free speech rights.165 
Sachs J considers that constitutional law should seek to prevent the suppression of 
subversive acts of laughter and humour: “The Constitution cannot oblige the dour to 
laugh. It can, however, prevent the cheerless from snuffing out the laughter of the 
blithe spirits among us”.166 The judge observed that "we are obliged to interpret the 
law in a manner which protects the right of bodies such as Laugh it Off to advance 
subversive humour."167 His Honour noted:  "The protection must be there whether the 
humour is expressed by mimicry in drag, or cartooning in the press, or the production 
of lampoons on T-shirts."168  Sachs J emphasized:  "What has been relevant in the 
present matter is that the context was one of laughter being used as a means of 
challenging economic power, resisting ideological hegemony and advancing human 
dignity."169  The judge concluded:  "Indeed, if our society became completely solemn 
because of the exercise of state power at the behest of the worthy, not only would all 
irrelevant laughter be suppressed, but temperance considerations could end up placing 
beer-drinking itself in jeopardy."170 
The decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa is an enlightened judgment 
on trade-mark dilution, culture jamming, and freedom of expression. The decision 
provides a strong explanation of the origins, nature, and evolution of the doctrine of 
trade mark dilution. The judges emphasize, though, the need for trade mark owners to 
prove the likelihood of any appreciable detriment to the reputation of trade marks. 
The two judgments of the Constitutional Court of South Africa consider the culture 
nature of the work of Laugh It Off Promotions. The decision of Sachs J is superior in 
this regard because it shows a particular sensitivity and understanding of the practices 
of culture jamming. The ruling of the Constitutional Court of South Africa also 
considers the interplay between intellectual property and constitutional law in a deft 
and elegant way. The two judgments offer a thoughtful meditation on the how 
intellectual property rights should be read in light of larger constitutional 
considerations about freedom of political expression and freedom of artistic creativity. 
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3.4 Aftermath of the Litigation 
Laugh It Off Promotions was understandably elated by the decision of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa.  The t-shirt company's founder Justin Bartlett 
Nurse observed:  "It's cool: I feel like Steven Gerrard [sublime Liverpool and England 
football player], except without the boots".171  He conjectured:  "It is an important 
case, and in some respects an international legal precedent has been set."172  In 
celebration of the decision, Laugh It Off Promotions auctioned 1,000 “Black Labour/ 
White Guilt” t-shirts off on its website, and donated the proceeds to an anti-alcohol 
abuse charity. The group has been emboldened and reinvigorated by the decision of 
the Constitutional Court.  Laugh It Off Promotions has released its latest annual book 
under a Creative Commons licence that permits copying and re-mixing.  A partner of 
the company observed: "If people want to use the work as an inspiration or a point of 
departure for a new work and they give the authors credit, that’s great." 173 The 
judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa has also deterred and 
discouraged various trade mark owners from pursuing actions for trade mark 
infringement and dilution against Laugh It Off Promotions. 
FXI emphasized that the decision "sends a strong message to commercial companies 
in the country who attempt to trump freedom of expression in future that the Court 
will speak with one voice in rejecting the Constitutionality of such attempts."174  FXI 
hailed the judgment: 
The ruling represents a triumph of freedom of expression over 
intellectual property rights. The Court has prioritized the right of 
cultural activists to engage in speech that is critical of the pervasive 
power of trademarks in everyday life over the right of SAB to 
protect its intellectual property; in the process, it has opened the 
space for activists who engage in 'cultural jamming' - or the 
criticism of commercial speech through parody - to have their 
activities constitutionally protected. Trademarks such as the 'Black 
Label' logo are pervasive in South African public space; they 
command significant public attention given the financial resources 
they command to get their messages across. It is correct that 
cultural activists like the Laugh it Off team are allowed to put their 
parodies of these trademarks into public space as well, and that this 
right should be protected.175 
FXI noted that the fact that Laugh it Off gained commercially from the sale of their T-
shirt mattered little, because it had not resulted in significant prejudice to the Black 
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Label trade mark.  It observed:  "The SAB action can only be interpreted as bully-boy 
tactics trying to stamp on the rights of ordinary people, and the FXI welcomes the fact 
that the Court has put them in their place."176  FXI concluded: "The judgement should 
hopefully ensure that commercial companies will desist from using their financial 
muscle to play corporate bullies, threatening to run those who parody the 
commodification of public space out of business".177 The decision has had immediate 
repercussions for other South African cases dealing with intellectual property and 
freedom of expression.  As a result of the decision, the South African 
telecommunications carrier, Telkom, withdrew its defamation and copyright 
infringement case against the creators of Hellkom, a satirical site protesting  against 
the high tariffs and poor service of the company [Figures 19 and 20].  
In response to the decision, South African Breweries complained that trade marks 
were threatened by the decision of the Constitutional Court that a t-shirt maker has the 
right to mock its Carling Black Label brand: 
The decision suggests the dignity or reputation of a trademark will 
not be afforded protection in itself.  In other words, you can 
disparage a brand as long as the sales of that brand are not likely to 
be reduced.  This, we believe, could be of concern to trademark 
holders. 
We fully support freedom of expression.  However, it has always 
been our view that this issue is not one that involves genuine 
freedom of expression. Trade marks are important commercial 
assets of a company and, like any other company, large or small, we 
have an obligation to protect our trade mark rights and brand 
equity and reputation.178 
Perhaps the company needs to reconsider its policy in respect of trade mark 
enforcement.  As Jeremy Phillips counsels, "brand owners should be taught that 
litigation need not be the first step but the last course of action, after all else fails."179  
He also recommends that "brand owners have to realize that trade mark laws have 
built-in mechanisms which require them to face criticism, even if that criticism 
explicitly mentions the trade marks upon which it is based."180 Indeed, it is striking 
that a number of trade mark owners targeted by Laugh It Off Promotions – including 
such well-known entities such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, Shell, e-tv, Diesel, 
McDonald’s,181 Virgin, and National Lottery – refrained from litigation. Some of 
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those parties, though, have been willing to take action for trade mark infringement in 
other factual circumstances and scenarios. 
4. Trade mark dilution 
Trade marks are often selected for their effervescent qualities, and 
then injected into the stream of communication with the pressure of 
a firehose by means of mass media campaigns. Where trade marks 
come to carry so much communicative freight, allowing the trade 
mark holder to restrict their use implicates our collective interest in 
free and open communication. 
 
Justice Alex Kozinski
182
 
The decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Laugh It Off Promotions 
v. South African Breweries International has attracted the odd admirer outside South 
Africa – particularly for the eloquent prose of Sachs J.183However, the decision has 
been thus far overlooked by superior courts in other jurisdictions. Arguably, the ruling 
in Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International is a persuasive 
precedent, which should be followed in other jurisdictions. Katja Weckström has 
observed that there is a need to take notice of decisions of superior courts, such as the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa: “Since national trademark rules share a 
common source, national courts should look to prior decisions on the issue by other 
courts and engage in an international dialogue”.184 It remains to be seen whether other 
jurisdictions will follow the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
especially those with weaker constitutional protections of civil and political rights to 
freedom of expression.  As Sachs J notes:  "The tension in modern society between 
the need to protect both free speech and intellectual property... results in court 
decisions that are highly fact-sensitive, and not easily transported."185 
Arguably, the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Laugh It Off 
Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International could be helpful in resolving 
policy disputes over trade mark dilution in other jurisdictions. The judges in the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa demonstrate a larger awareness of comparative 
law dealing with trade mark dilution and parodies. Particular reference is made to 
United States case law on trade mark dilution and parodies. The Supreme Court of the 
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United States considered the operation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 
(US) in Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc.186 There has been much 
consternation about this decision, especially from trade mark loyalists who fear that 
the Bench has set the standard of harm for trade mark dilution far too high. There has 
been concern that lower courts have inconsistently applied the principles of trade 
mark dilution. Certainly, there have been conflicting outcomes and results in respect 
of trade mark actions against parodists. In response to such concerns, the United 
States Congress has passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 2006 (US). This 
legislation seeks to lower the standard of harm for trade mark owners, and clarifying 
the meaning of key concepts; but broadening the available defences for trade mark 
users. Arguably, there is a need to subject such intellectual property rights to 
constitutional scrutiny to ensure that they do not have a chilling effect upon freedom 
of speech, and freedom of communication. 
4.1Trade Mark Dilution and Victoria’s Secret Catalogue 
The phrase, “trademark dilution”, was first coined by Frank Schechter in the Harvard 
Law Review in 1927.187  He observed that “dilution” involved "the gradual whittling 
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name 
by its use upon non-competing goods".188 
The magisterial treatise writer on trade mark law, J. Thomas McCarthy, has lamented 
that trade mark dilution has been the source of great confusion and misunderstanding 
in the judiciary, the profession, and the academy: 
No part of trademark law that I have encountered in my forty years 
of teaching and practicing IP law has created so much doctrinal 
puzzlement and judicial incomprehension as the concept of 
‘dilution’ as a form of intrusion on a trademark. It is a daunting 
pedagogical challenge to explain even the basic theoretical concept 
of dilution to students, attorneys and judges. Few can successfully 
explain it without encountering stares of incomprehension or worse, 
nods of understanding which mask and conceal bewilderment and 
misinterpretation.189 
There has been much debate about the merits of trade mark dilution. Some 
commentators see trade mark dilution as an unwelcome sui generis regime, which 
distorts the traditional balances laid by trade mark law. Robert Klieger has argued that 
trade mark dilution law poses an anti-competitive threat to market efficiency and 
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consumer welfare.190However, others have embraced trade mark dilution as a 
welcome judicial and legislative innovation. Jason Bosl and has defended the merits 
of trade mark dilution: “Trade mark dilution is not only a private concern for the trade 
mark owner - it also involves a concurrent public detriment in the lessening of a 
relatively stable language by which to contribute to public and cultural discourse”.191 
On January 16, 1996, United States President Bill Clinton signed into law new federal 
trade mark dilution laws.  Section 43 (c) (1) of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
1995 (US) provides:  "The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the 
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an 
injunction against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade 
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this 
subsection." The legislation stipulated a number of factors to be taken into account in 
such determinations.192Section 45 provided: “The term ‘dilution’ means the lessening 
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, 
regardless of the presence or absence of(1) competition between the owner of the 
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” 
In Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., the Supreme Court of the United 
States considered a claim for trade mark dilution by the lingerie store, Victoria's 
Secret, against a Kentucky store selling lingerie under the brand "Victor's Little 
Secret".193 The decision offered the bench an opportunity to rule upon the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act1995 (US). 
There were a number of submissions from amicus curiae, friends of the court. 
Moseley was supported in part by the United States Government. An intellectual 
property professor, Malla Pollack, contended that trade mark dilution required 
evidence of actual harm because of larger constitutional concerns: “Removing the 
actual harm element of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US) would 
unnecessarily multiply constitutional issues under both the First Amendment and the 
Copyright and Patent Clause”.194 Victoria’s Secret Catalogue Inc. was supported by 
the International Trademark Association, the American Bar Association, the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, Intellectual Property Professors, the 
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Intel Corporation, Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows and various 
other trade mark owners. 
In the course of oral argument, the parties discussed the impact of trade mark law 
upon parodies. On behalf of the respondents, Moseley, Mr Dellinger observed: 
“Congress... made it absolutely clear that it wanted the safe harbors read as broadly as 
possible to ensure that there was no restriction on First Amendment rights, so the 
courts are warmly invited to create as large a safe harbor for parody.”195He observed 
that tarnishment had been restricted in case law to unsavoury associations, with sex 
and drug use: 
People can use the term, Victoria's Secret, for any purpose they 
want in parody and commentary, on the steps of the courthouse. 
They just can't make this one use of it, that is a commercial use in 
commerce that lessens the capacity of that mark to carry out its 
function that Congress so clearly had in mind when it passed the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US).
196
 
His suggestion was that the Moseley brand "Victor's Little Secret" did not constitute 
trade mark dilution. 
In the leading opinion, Stevens J observed that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
1995 (US) intended "to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the 
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it."197  His Honour emphasized that 
actual dilution had to be established, not merely a likelihood of dilution:   
The record in this case establishes that an army officer who saw the 
advertisement of the opening of a store named "Victor's Secret" did 
make the mental association with "Victoria's Secret," but it also 
shows that he did not therefore form any different impression of the 
store that his wife and daughter had patronized. There is a complete 
absence of evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria's 
Secret mark to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in 
Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its catalogs. The officer was 
offended by the ad, but it did not change his conception of Victoria's 
Secret. His offense was directed entirely at petitioners, not at 
respondents. Moreover, the expert retained by respondents had 
nothing to say about the impact of petitioners' name on the strength 
of respondents' mark. 198 
Stevens J observed that "direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not 
be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evidence 
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-the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical".199 He 
concluded that the evidence in the present record was insufficient to support the 
summary judgment on the dilution count. 
Concurring, Kennedy J provided this gloss on the meaning of trade mark dilution: “If 
a mark will erode or lessen the power of the famous mark to give customers the 
assurance of quality and the full satisfaction they have in knowing they have 
purchased goods bearing the famous mark, the elements of dilution may be 
established”.200His Honour concluded:  "Diminishment of the famous mark’s capacity 
can be shown by the probable consequences flowing from use or adoption of the 
competing mark."201 
4.2 Trade Mark Parodies 
There has been a large amount of litigation on trade mark law and parodies in the 
United States, which has attracted significant commentary.202 
In a grand overview of this field, Bruce Keller and Rebecca Tushnet comments that 
there have been two major developments in the United States law of trade mark 
parodies since the mid-1990s.203  First of all, the judiciary has applied the fair use test 
developed in relation to copyright law and parody in the context of trade mark 
law.204Second, the courts have been forced to consider whether parodies are diluting 
of trade marks in light of the new Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US). Keller 
and Tushnet observe:  
Parodies can be funny or offensive. What is certain is that they are 
frustrating, enough so that intellectual property owners may litigate 
out of a sense of wounded dignity even when there is a strong fair 
use defense. Because parody determinations are fact-intensive – and 
sometimes dependent on a judge’s response to their humor or lack 
thereof – predictions remain extremely difficult. We have no ready 
answer to this problem; we can only suggest that the parody/ satire 
divide has proved a frolic and detour ill suited to proper intellectual 
                                                 
199
 Ibid, at 434. 
200
 Ibid, at 435. 
201
 Ibid, at 435-436. 
202
 R Dreyfuss, “Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language In The Pepsi Generation”, (1990), 65 
Notre Dame Law Review 397; R Coombe, A Herman, "Trademarks, Property, and Propriety: The 
Moral Economy of Consumer Politics and Corporate Accountability on the World Wide Web", (2000), 
50 De Paul Law Review 597-632; and R Coombe, A Herman, "Culture Wars on the Net: Trademarks, 
Consumer Politics and Corporate Accountability on the World Wide Web", (2001), 100 South Atlantic 
Quarterly 919-947; P Gulasekaram, “Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: 
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works”, (2005), 80 Washington Law Review 
887.  
203
 B Keller, R Tushnet, "Even More Parodic Than The Real Thing:  Parody Law Suits Revisited", 
(2004), 94 Trademark Reporter 979-1016. 
204
 Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music Inc. (1994) 127 L Ed 2d 500. 
 (2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
 
109 
property policy. Courts should take a broader view of 
transformation when they address humorous (and nonhumorous) 
unauthorized uses of works, marks or images.205 
The authors lamented that “courts generally have responded to parodies accused of 
dilution by ignoring the First Amendment value of parodic commentary or by 
defining dilution narrowly rather than by invoking Campbell-type First Amendment 
concerns are providing special solicitude for parodies.”206 
Some of the earlier case law is very much hostile to parodies in trade mark law. In 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted an injunction to Dallas Cowboys against a 
pornographic film, “Debbie Does Dallas”.207 The judge rejected the argument that the 
film constituted a parody: “Although, as defendants assert, the doctrine of fair use 
permits limited copyright infringement for purposes of parody, defendants' use of 
plaintiff's uniform hardly qualifies as parody or any other form of fair use.”208 In San 
Francisco Arts and Athletics Inc. v. US Olympic Committee, the Supreme Court of the 
United States upheld the United States Olympic Committee’s rights to the words 
“Olympic” and held that it could prohibit any uses of the term “Olympic” that it found 
offensive – in this case, the “Gay Olympic Games”.209 
In Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co v. Novak, the court considered the use of the trade 
mark of an insurance company on T-shirts and coffee mugs to make a point about 
nuclear proliferation [Figure 21].210 This use was found not to be parody because the 
defendant was not commenting on the plaintiff’s trade mark or business. In Anheuser-
Busch Inc v. Balducci Publications, the court considered a fake advertisement, in 
which the plaintiff’s beer Michelob was represented as an oily product [Figure 22].211 
The intended message concerned an oil spill which had no connection with Michelob 
and water pollution in general. In balancing the trademark owner’s rights against that 
protected under the First Amendment, the court found that the First Amendment 
defence had to yield to Michelob’s rights. 
In New Kids On The Block v. News America Publishing Inc, a boy band brought a law 
suit for trade mark infringement against newspapers which used telephone polls to 
judge who was the most popular member of the band. Kozinski J observed:  "Most 
useful social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were 
under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, 
company or product using its trade mark".212  His Honour held that, in the trade mark 
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context, nominative use becomes fair use when a plaintiff proves three elements: 
“First, the plaintiff's product or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the mark or marks 
may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the plaintiff's product or service; 
and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder”.213 Kozinski J held that the 
newspapers were entitled to a nominative fair use defence.  His Honour maintained 
that the fact that newspapers had used toll telephone numbers to conduct a poll did not 
make the defence unavailable. 
In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions Inc, Hormel, the producers of the 
processed meat product Spam
®
 sued Jim Henson Productions for trade mark 
infringement and dilution for including a pig character named Spa’am to its film 
Muppet Treasure Island.214 The Court of Appeals reiterated that a parody of a strong 
mark is less likely to be confusing than a parody of a weak mark. The appellate court 
also noted that the Muppets were well-known for parodies, which would increase the 
likelihood that viewers would expect and get the joke. 
In Dr Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books, the Court of Appeals also considered 
whether there was a trade mark infringement as a result of confusion in the market 
place as to the source of Penguin and Dove's The Cat NOT in the Hat! Penguin and 
Dove argue that their identical and confusingly similar use of Seuss' marks was offset 
by the work's parodic character [Figure 23].215  The Court of Appeals noted: "In 
several cases, the courts have held, in effect, that poking fun at a trademark is no joke 
and have issued injunctions".216  It concluded that the "claim of parody is no defense 
'where the purpose of the similarity is to capitalize on a famous mark's popularity for 
the defendant's own commercial use'".217 The Court of Appeals warned that “the cry of 
‘parody!’ does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate claims of trademark 
infringement or dilution.”218 
In Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Capece, the Elvis Presley estate sued restaurant 
operators, alleging, inter alia, that their service mark, "The Velvet Elvis," infringed or 
diluted plaintiff's federal and common-law trade marks, and violated its right of 
publicity in Elvis Presley's name.219  The Court of Appeals observed that "parody is 
not a defense to trade mark infringement, but rather another factor to be considered, 
which weighs against a finding of a likelihood of confusion".220 It cited the view of a 
treatise: 
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Some parodies will constitute an infringement, some will not. But 
the cry of "parody!" does not magically fend off otherwise legitimate 
claims of trademark infringement or dilution. There are confusing 
parodies and non-confusing parodies. All they have in common is 
an attempt at humor through the use of someone else's trademark. A 
non-infringing parody is merely amusing, not confusing.221 
The Court of Appeals held that the district court failed to consider impact of 
defendants' advertising practices on their use of the service mark and misapplied the 
doctrine of parody.  It found that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction because 
"The Velvet Elvis" mark infringed the plaintiff's marks. 
In Starbucksv.Dwyer, Kieron Dwyer was sued by Starbucks for copyright 
infringement, trade mark infringement, trade mark dilution and unfair competition.222 
The cartoonist had created a parody of Starbucks’ siren logo – which featured the tag 
“consumer whore”. He placed the picture on coffee mugs, t-shirts, and stickers that he 
sold on his website and at comic book conventions. The United States District Court 
for Northern California held that that the corporation was unlikely to succeed on its 
copyright and trade mark infringement claims because Dwyer’s drawing was likely to 
be deemed a legitimate parody. However, the court granted an injunction because it 
also found that the defendant’s parody tarnished Starbucks’ image, and constituted 
trade mark dilution. Dwyer was asked to remove the parody from his website. The 
case was ultimately settled out of court because Dwyer was unable to afford the costs 
of any appeals. 
The academic Kembrew McLeod has observed that there has been a shift in United 
States jurisprudence towards the protection of parodies: 
The internal policies that regulate the behaviour and output of 
universities, movie studios, book-publishing houses, and other 
culture-producing entities have grown more conservative and 
cautious in recent years. At the same time, ironically, some 
American judges have increasingly been reaffirming the value of 
free speech when commenting on privately owned images, logos, or 
phrases. Although no tidal wave has swept across the judicial 
system, washing away all overzealous trademark bozos, a few key 
recent cases have established important precedents.223 
The pundit cites the precedent of Mastercard v. Nader, in which the United States 
District Court ruled that Ralph Nader’s parody of MasterCard’s “Priceless” 
advertising campaign in the 2000 presidential race did not constitute trade mark 
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infringement because it created little likelihood of consumer confusion.224 In this 
matter, the District Court held “that Ralph Nader's use of plaintiff's trademarks is not 
commercial, but instead political in nature and that therefore, it is exempted from 
coverage by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US)”.225 Since that the ruling, 
there has been a broad range of political parodies – from satirical political groups, 
such as “Billionaires for Bush”, to “mash-up” Internet videos of United States 
Presidential candidates, such as Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, and even 
Australian politicians.226 
In Mattel Inc. v. MCA Records Inc, the Ninth Circuit considered Mattel's claim of a 
trade mark infringement and dilution against the producers of a 1997 top 40 hit song 
by the band Aqua entitled "Barbie Girl".227 Kozinski J characterized the facts of the 
case with his customary legal wit:  "If this were a sci-fi melodrama, it might be called 
Speech-Zilla meets Trademark Kong".228 
Kozinski J commented that trade marks can transcend their identifying purpose and 
enter into the public discourse and become part of the general vocabulary:  "Once 
imbued with such expressive flavour, the trademark becomes a word in our language 
and assumes a role outside the bounds of trademark law". 229 His Honour emphasized 
that the First Amendment protects such expressive uses of trade marks:  "The 
trademark owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever the 
public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying function".230 
Kozinski J observed:  "The song does not rely on the Barbie mark to poke fun at 
another subject but targets Barbie herself".231  His Honour concluded that MCA 
Records' use of Barbie was not an infringement of Mattel's trademark. Kozinski J held 
that the use of trade mark was not purely commercial speech, and therefore was 
protected against a claim of trade mark dilution. His Honour observed that "the song 
also lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on the cultural values 
Aqua claims she represents".232 Finally, Kozinski J dismissed a counterclaim by MCA 
Records for defamation based on a representative of Mattel accusing the company of 
being a "bank robber" engaged in "heist", "crime", "theft", and "piracy".  His Honour 
quipped:  "No one hearing this accusation understands intellectual property owners to 
be saying that infringers are nautical cutthroats with eye patches and peg legs who 
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board galleons to plunder cargo".233  Dismissing such terms as "rhetorical hyperbole", 
Kozinski J concluded: "The parties are advised to chill".234 
The decision of Kozinski J cannot be dismissed as the musings of a maverick judge.  
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the judgment by refusing to give the 
company Mattel leave to appeal the decision of the Ninth Circuit.235 
More recently, in Mattel Incv.Walking Mountain Productions, the United States 
Federal Court considered a legal action brought by Mattel against an artist who 
produced photographs which parodied the lifestyle represented by Barbie dolls.236 The 
court considered the claims of Mattel that Forsythe was engaged in trademark 
infringement [Figure 24].237 The judge cited McCarthy's opinionthat"[t]arnishment 
caused merely by an editorial or artistic parody which satirizes plaintiff's product or 
its image is not actionable under an anti-dilution statute because of the free speech 
protections of the First Amendment".238 His Honour dismissed the claims of Mattel:  
"Forsythe's artistic and parodic work is considered noncommercial speech and, 
therefore, not subject to a trademark dilution claim."239 
It is striking that this large corpus of jurisprudence makes no specific mention of the 
aesthetic practices of culture jamming, notwithstanding its influence and significance. 
The courts instead reduce the various cultural practices to the dialectic of legitimate 
“parody” versus trade mark infringement and dilution. There is a need for the 
judiciary to show a greater level of cultural awareness, and transcend such schematic 
oppositions. There is a need to enlarge the scope of protection afforded to cultural 
discourse to protect a range of transformative works – including culture jamming, 
“adbusting”, and “mash-ups” – from the threat of action for trade mark infringement 
and dilution.240 
4.3 Trademark Dilution Revision Act 2006 (US) 
The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property held an inquiry into the operation of the trade mark dilution laws. 
The International Trademark Association lobbied the United States Congress for a 
revision of trade mark dilution law. The President of the organisation, Anne 
Gundelfinger, lamented that trade mark dilution was in need of repair: “Nine years 
and hundreds of cases after the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US) was 
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enacted, virtually everyone—courts, litigants, commentators alike— agree that the 
law is a mess”.241The President observed: “This means more costly litigation, forum 
shopping, inconsistent application of the law, and greater risk to the ability of famous 
marks to function effectively as strong brands for their owners and for American 
consumers.”242 
In the proceedings, the American Civil Liberties Union raised the concerns about the 
over-reaching impact of trade mark dilution laws upon freedom of speech and artistic 
criticism. Its spokesperson, Marvin Johnson, commented: “Trademark law provides 
an important tool for preventing confusion or deceptive marketing, but trademark 
laws should not be used as a pretext to stifle criticism, parody or legitimate 
competition when there is no reasonable likelihood of confusion and no actual 
dilution caused by use of the trademark.”243 He illustrated his concerns with an 
example: 
An example is Adbusters Media Foundation and its magazine, 
Adbusters. This publication features advertisement parodies, called 
‘‘subvertisements,’’ which use trademarks and corporate logos to 
generate awareness about social and political issues. One issue 
featured “Joe Chemo,” a parody of the “Joe Camel” character 
used by Camel cigarettes, to raise awareness of the health issues 
surrounding smoking. These ads represent a type of important civic 
speech that is traditionally protected under the First Amendment. It 
makes critical commentary on the trademark holder, furthering the 
traditional goals of trademark law by informing the consumer about 
the goods and services they purchase. While the speech is 
predominantly civic in nature, the commercial element of selling the 
magazine could well mean that the trademark holder under the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995 (US) could silence its critical 
speech.244 
He concluded: “Where, however, a trademark is used for parody, commentary, or 
criticism of a product or service, confusion is far less likely, and the government’s 
interest in protecting a trademark over free speech is minimal.”245 
In 2006, the United States Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 2006 
(US).246 Republican Representative Lamar Smith explained that the legislation 
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“clarifies a muddied legal landscape and enables the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
1995 (US) to operate as Congress intended”.247 He observed that the legislation was 
designed to respond to, and overturn, “a 2003 Supreme Court decision involving 
Victoria's Secret ruled that the standard of harm in dilution cases is actual 
harm”.248The legislation has three main sets of legislative provisions. First of all, the 
legislation overrrules the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
establishes that actual harm is not a necessary requirement; it is sufficient to 
demonstrate that a mere likelihood of harm is established.249 Second, the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act 2006 (US) was intended to resolve disputes between regional 
circuits have as to the meaning of what constitutes a "famous" mark, and the 
definitions of "distinctiveness," "blurring," and "tarnishment."250 Thus, the legislation 
provides further definitions of such critical concepts.251 Finally, Smith commented that 
the “amendments developed by the subcommittee and the other body will more 
clearly protect traditional first amendment uses, such as parody and criticism”.252 The 
legislation provides that certain activities shall not be actionable as dilution by 
blurring or dilution by tarnishment – including “any fair use, including a nominative 
or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use”, “all forms of news reporting 
and news commentary” and “any non-commercial use of a mark.”253 
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The new legislation has been tested in a recent case. In Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 
Haute Diggity Dog, the manufacturer of luxury handbags sued maker of plush dog 
chew toys, alleging trade mark infringement, trade mark dilution, and copyright 
infringement.254 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
granted summary judgment for toy maker. The manufacturer appealed. Niemeyer J of 
the Court of Appeals held: “We agree with the district court that the “Chewy Vuiton” 
dog toys are successful parodies of LVM handbags and the LVM marks and trade 
dress used in connection with the marketing and sale of those handbags”.255The judge 
ruled that there is no blurring or tarnishment of the original trade mark: “Even as 
Haute Diggity Dog's parody mimics the famous mark, it communicates 
simultaneously that it is not the famous mark, but is only satirizing it”.256The judge 
concluded: “And because the famous mark is particularly strong and distinctive, it 
becomes more likely that a parody will not impair the distinctiveness of the mark.”257 
The American Civil Liberties Union remains concerned about the operation of the 
legislation, noting: “Unfortunately, courts, in construing trademark law have often 
undertaken a parsimonious parsing of the statutory language instead of applying 
broader constitutional principles.”258 The organisation observes: “If the trademark 
holder can stop criticism through the use of trademark law, it diminishes free speech 
and impoverishes the marketplace of ideas the First Amendment was intended to 
nurture.”259 
In his magnum opus, Freedom of Speech, Eric Barendt has observed that, 
theoretically, satire and parody should be afforded protection under First Amendment 
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech: 
Trade mark laws confer on the proprietor of a mark an exclusive 
right to use a particular sign or symbol in connection with specified 
commercial activities. Trade marks give consumers information 
about the origin of the goods or services; they, therefore, imply that 
the products are of an established quality, and in a sense promote 
or advertise it. For a business to use the trade mark of its 
competitor to market its own goods misleads consumers and clearly 
amounts to unfair competition. Even if such use were treated as 
commercial speech, its restriction would clearly be justified. Harder 
free speech questions are posed by the use of another’s trade mark 
for the purpose of satire or parody. In principle, that should 
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certainly be covered, and perhaps protected, by a free speech 
provision.260 
Nonetheless, in United States jurisprudence, Barendt noted that “it seems that while 
free speech is often considered more important than the privacy or dignity of 
individuals, it is not as important as the ability of an organization to protect its 
monopoly right to use particular words and symbols”.261There is a need to ensure that 
trade mark dilution law does not stifle forms of cultural production, such as the 
various strategies of culture jamming, and new artistic forms, such as “mash-ups”.262 
5. Conclusion 
In the case of Laugh It Off Promotions v. South African Breweries International, the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa has provided succour for “adbusters”, culture 
jammers, and the No Logo movement against claims of trade mark owners.  In his 
judgment, Sachs J comments upon the need for constitutional protection of levity and 
humour: 
A society that takes itself too seriously risks bottling up its tensions 
and treating every example of irreverence as a threat to its 
existence. Humour is one of the great solvents of democracy. It 
permits the ambiguities and contradictions of public life to be 
articulated in non-violent forms. It promotes diversity. It enables a 
multitude of discontents to be expressed in a myriad of spontaneous 
ways. It is an elixir of constitutional health.263 
The ruling of the Constitutional Court of South Africa provides support for the 
reformation of trade mark law to provide greater latitude for the practices of culture 
jamming.264 A high standard of proof should be demanded in respect of trade mark 
dilution – the actual harm standard articulated by the Supreme Court of the United 
States is preferable to lesser thresholds. Graeme Austin has observed: “Smarter, more 
self-critical, more engaged, less mesmerized consumers are less likely to be easily 
confused”.265 Accordingly, there should also be a re-conception of consumer 
impressions of “confusion”, “deception”, “blurring” and “tarnishment”.As Megan 
Richardson suggests, there is a need to expand the range of exceptions and limitations 
for trade mark law, in light of the expansion of protection for well-known and famous 
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trade marks.266There is a need to particular for broad latitude to be given not only to 
parody and satire, but various forms of culture jamming. The decision in Laugh It Off 
Promotions v. South African Breweries International demonstrates the need to take 
into account larger constitutional considerations about freedom of speech. The case 
shows a need to carefully consider the interplay between intellectual property rights 
and constitutional law.267 
Furthermore, the litigation highlights the need for a change in attitudes amongst trade 
mark owners and their legal advisers. Giselle Fahimian hopes that intellectual 
property lawyers become “a bit more appreciative of the importance of parody, 
artistic reworking, and social commentary in shaping a diverse and creative culture, 
and a bit more concerned with balancing zealous client advocacy with respect for 
creativity and free speech”.268 Justin Bartlett Nurse of Laugh It Off Promotions 
emphasizes the social benefits of free speech and criticism in a deliberative 
democracy: 
We scream a lot about free speech, because it achieves a very 
simple and powerful thing: Where the half-lies of both sides clash 
and burn each other out, the truth emerges from the ashes. Without 
that intellectual exchange of fire, you don't even have the beginnings 
of a progressive, forward-looking society. You have mental 
quicksand, a group of people slowly sinking into their own half-
formed ideas of the world, because that's the only way they know to 
survive. Keeping our mental channels open is the only way to avoid 
that, and more people everyday are convinced that can't be done if 
an emotive symbol like a brand is considered untouchable.269 
It is imperative that the courts prevent trade mark owners from relying upon trade 
mark dilution laws to stifle artistic expression and freedom of speech – particularly in 
respect of the creative activities of culture jamming and “adbusting”.
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Figure 1. March to the High Court of South Africa. 
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Figure 2.  Carling Black Label. 
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Figure 3. Black Labour/ White Guilt T-Shirt 
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Figure 4. Mr Sin 
 
 
Figure 5. Weed-Brix 
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Figure 6. Dead Bull. 
 
 
Figure 7. Death Toll. 
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Figure 8. Denial for Successful Loafing 
 
 
Figure 9. Blacks Like Me. 
 
 (2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
 
126 
Figure 10. Corruption. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Moo: Make Every Day A Cow’s Last. 
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Figure 12. Viagra 
 
Figure 13. Adbusters Billboard. 
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Figure 14. No Logo. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Conceptual 
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Figure 16. Pro Logo. 
 
 
Figure 17. Pro Logo. 
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Figure 18. The Rebel Sell 
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 Figure 19. Telkom. 
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Figure 20. Hellkom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (2008) 5:1 SCRIPT-ed 
 
 
135 
Figure 21.  Omaha Insurance Trademarks and "Mutant of Omaha" Anti-
Nuclear Icons. 
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Figure 22.  Michelob Fake Advertisement. 
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Figure 23.  The Cat Not In The Hat. 
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Figure 24.  Tim Forsythe.  "Food Chain Barbie" 1999. 
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